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1 Introduction
The Porter hypothesis, originally developed by Porter (1991) and Porter and
Linde (1995), is one of the most contested topics in environmental economics.
The authors contend that environmental regulation creates a win-win situa-
tion by generating R&D that not only reduces pollution, but also increases
firm profits. Arguably, the Porter hypothesis has led to a paradigm shift in
environmental economics,1 and is of great significance from a policy perspec-
tive (see, e.g. Gore, 1992).
Porter and Linde (1995) provide a series of case studies supporting their
claim. From a theoretical point of view however, Portney (1994) and Palmer
et al. (1995) challenge the validity of the Porter hypothesis. They use a sim-
ple static model of environmental regulation with a monopoly firm producing
a dirty product, and deciding among two technologies that differ in their pol-
lution levels to analyze the effects of stricter environmental regulations. They
make the point that if a technology was not worth investing in before, then
its benefits will not be enough to fully offset the costs of compliance after
stricter regulations are enforced. Consequently it cannot be the case that an
increase in environmental regulation makes R&D more attractive.
In this paper we seek to provide a theoretical foundation for the Porter
hypothesis that, unlike most of the literature (discussed later), does not
depend on strategic interactions. We consider a two period dynamic model
with a monopoly firm producing a dirty product. This firm can either opt
for an existing dirty technology, or invest in a cleaner technology. With
hyperbolic (or present-biased) preferences we establish conditions such that
an increase in environmental regulation can both reduce pollution, as well
as increase firm profits - so that the Porter hypothesis goes through. This is
likely to hold whenever the R&D costs are at an intermediate level, and the
planning horizon of the firms is large.
1See, Kuhn (1970) for an interpretation of scientific revolutions as paradigm shifts.
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We then briefly relate our paper to the literature. Following Portney
(1994) and Palmer et al. (1995), the subsequent literature has tried to iden-
tify conditions under which environmental regulations can generate R&D,
thus reducing pollution, as well as increasing firm profits. Simpson and
Bradford (1996), for example, show that environmental taxes can lead to a
reduction in R&D by foreign firms, thus increasing domestic profits. Xepa-
padeas and de Zeeuw (1999) demonstrate that environmental regulations can
lead to an increase in average productivity via the modernization effect - i.e.
a phasing out of inefficient capital. This can partially offset the increased
costs of environmental regulation. Osang and Nandy (2003) focus on the
external economies associated with R&D, showing that with large spill-over
effects, emission caps may increase innovation incentives. Mohr (2002) also
focuses on external economies, but in a general equilibrium framework. Roy
Chowdhury (2009) identifies two new strategic effects, the relative efficiency
effect and the competition softening effect, of environmental regulations un-
der price competition. Kriechel and Ziesemer (2009) use a game of timing
of technology adoption to examine the Porter hypothesis, showing that en-
vironmental tax will turn the preemption game with low profits into a game
with credible precommitment generating higher profits.
Thus the literature has so far identified various strategic effects, namely
first mover advantages, changing the composition of capital, the relative effi-
ciency effect, external economies, etc. that can provide a formal foundation
for the Porter hypothesis. The present paper adds to the literature by show-
ing that in the presence of hyperbolic preferences, the Porter hypothesis may
go through even in the absence of any strategic effects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
basic framework, identifying conditions such that the Porter hypothesis goes
through. Section 3 extends the analysis in several directions, while Section
4 concludes.
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2 The Framework and Analysis
The model comprises a single monopoly firm producing a dirty product and
facing a market demand of f(q). We assume that f(q) is continuous, nega-
tively sloped and intersects both axes.
We next describe the technology. The existing technology is dirty, involv-
ing a production cost c(q), with one unit of output generating one unit of
pollution. By investing an amount F in R&D, the firm can however access
a clean technology with cost function c˜(q) that generates no pollution, and
is efficient in that the cost function c˜(q) < c(q),∀q > 0. Note that our for-
mulation is in line with Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) who find that new
vintages of capital are not only more efficient, but often less polluting than
the earlier vintages. In the next section we extend the analysis to allow for
more realistic R&D technologies, namely those that are non-deterministic,
as well as lagged.
In order to bring out the logic of our argument in a transparent fashion,
we begin by considering a lump sum abatement tax. Abatement tax thus
takes the value A > 0 whenever pollution is positive, and is zero otherwise.
We later allow for the case where the abatement tax varies continuously with
the level of pollution.
Let
pi(q) = qf(q)− c(q), (1)
p˜i(q) = qf(q)− c˜(q). (2)
We make the following assumption on the demand and the cost functions.
Assumption 1. (i) The cost functions c(q), c˜(q) are both continuous
(except possibly at the origin) and increasing in q, with c(0) = c˜(0) = 0.
(ii) pi(q) and p˜i(q) both have unique and interior maximizers.
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Given Assumption 1, let
pim = max
q
pi(q), (3)
p˜im = max
q
p˜i(q). (4)
From a simple revealed preference argument, p˜im > pim > 0.
We consider a two period model, with t = 1, 2. Each period is further
sub-divided into three stages. Consider period t, and suppose that the firm
is yet to invest in R&D:
In stage 1, the firm decides on whether to incur the R&D costs F , or
not. In case it does, the game goes to stage 2. Otherwise, the firm has the
existing technology and the game goes to stage 3.
In stage 2, the R&D expenditure fructifies, and the firm has the clean
new technology, with the production cost function c˜(q).
Finally, in stage 3, the firm decides on its output level.
In case the firm has already invested in R&D in the earlier period, then
the game goes directly to stage 3.
Note that even though the firm may invest in R&D in stage 1, even
then it has to wait until stage 2 for the new technology to become available.
While in our simple framework it would make no difference if stages 1 and
2 were coalesced, it is useful to keep this separation for conceptual clarity.
Alternatively, one could coalesce stages 1 and 2, and interpret this model
as one where the new technology is available off the shelf, and incurring F
simply means buying (or licensing) this already available technology. One
paper that clarifies this difference between investing in innovation and simply
adopting a new, though existing, technology is Downing and White (1986).2
The firm’s objective function is hyperbolic and is modeled using the stan-
2I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this point. In section 3 we re-visit the issue
of R&D lag, using a simple framework where the R&D fructifies in stages, rather than
instantaneously.
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dard β − δ formulation.3 For simplicity, we assume that β = 0, and δ = 1.
Letting U ti denote the firm’s utility at stage i of period t
U11 =
{
pim − A, if the dirty technology is adopted,
p˜im − F, if the clean technology is adopted.
U12 = U
1
3 =
{
pim − A, if the dirty technology is adopted,
p˜im, if the firm invests in R&D.
U21 =

pim − A, if the dirty technology is adopted,
p˜im − F, if the firm invests in R&D in period 2,
p˜im, if the firm had invested in R&D in period 1.
U22 = U
2
3 =
{
pim − A, if the dirty technology is adopted,
p˜im, if the firm has invested in R&D.
We solve this model using a standard backwards induction logic. At this
point it would be useful to define the notion of Porter hypothesis in this
framework.
Definition. The Porter hypothesis holds for a pair of abatement taxes
(A, A′), A′ > A, if
(a) the firm opts for the polluting technology under A,
(b) but opts to invest in environmental R&D when abatement taxes increase
to A′, and
(c) the firm’s present discounted profit (evaluated at δ = 1) under A′ exceeds
that under A, i.e.
2p˜im − F > 2pim − 2A.
We next turn to the analysis. We demonstrate that whenever F is at
an intermediate level (vis-a-vis the market parameters and A), there exists
A′ > A such that the Porter hypothesis goes through.
3This was originally proposed by Phelps and Pollack (1968), and used by, among many
others, Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).
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Proposition 1 Let 2(p˜im−pim) > F −2A > p˜im−pim−A. Then there exists
Aˆ (> A) such that for all A′ > Aˆ, the firm switches to the clean technology,
and its discounted profit is higher compared to that under A, so that the
Porter hypothesis goes through for (A,A′).
Proof. Suppose that the regulatory regime involves an abatement tax of
A. Given the utility function of the firm, the firm adopts the clean technology
at either period if and only if
p˜im − F > pim − A.
Given the second part of the hypothesis, this cannot hold. Next let
Aˆ = pim − p˜im + F.
Thus for all A′ > Aˆ, the firm adopts the new technology.
Finally, given the first part of the hypothesis, the present discounted
profit from adopting the clean technology under A′, exceeds that from not
adopting it under A, so that the Porter hypothesis holds.
The Portney (1994) and Palmer et al. (1995) critique relies on the follow-
ing two-step argument. In case the firm does not adopt the clean technology
under the existing level of abatement taxes, then, at this level of taxes, the
present discounted profit under the dirty technology must exceed that un-
der the clean technology. Hence, with stricter environmental regulations, the
discounted profit under the dirty technology must continue to be higher than
that under the clean technology. With a hyperbolic utility function, the first
step of the argument need not be true, allowing the Porter hypothesis to
hold.4
4Interestingly, most of the literature that appeals to strategic effects to justify the
Porter hypothesis, relies on the fact that with strategic interactions the second step of the
critique may be reversed.
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It is easy to see that the Portney (1994) and Palmer et al. (1995) critique
goes through in case the utility function of the monopolist is time consistent,
i.e. β = 1. In that case under the existing abatement tax A, the polluting
technology is adopted at t = 1 if and only if 2(p˜im − pim) < F − 2A. But
this implies that under A′ also the present discounted payoff under the old
technology exceeds that under the clean technology, thus violating the Porter
hypothesis. Consequently, the hyperbolic nature of the utility function is
critical to our results.
3 Discussion
In this section we extend the analysis in several directions.
n ≥ 2 periods. Suppose there are n ≥ 2 periods and let p˜im−F < pim−A.
Consider t = n and suppose that the clean technology has not been adopted
so far. Clearly, given A, the firm does not adopt the clean technology, whereas
for any A′ > Aˆ, where Aˆ = pim−p˜im+F, the firm adopts the clean technology.
Next a straightforward induction argument shows that if for any t > 1, it is
the case that the dirty technology is chosen at A, and the clean technology
is chosen for A′ > Aˆ, then the same must hold at t = 1.
We thus have
Proposition 2 Let p˜im − F < pim − A. Then there exists Aˆ > A such that
for all A′ > Aˆ, the firm selects the clean technology and, moreover, for a
sufficiently large n, discounted firm profit under the clean technology exceeds
discounted firm profits under the dirty technology (for A), i.e. n(p˜im−pim) >
F − A.
This shows that the Porter hypothesis is more likely to go through if the
firm’s planning horizon is long.
Generalizing the abatement tax function. Let the demand function be
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p = a − q, c(q) = cq, c˜(q) = c˜q, where c˜ < c, and two periods. Let the
abatement tax be Ae, where e is the amount of pollution and A is the tax
per unit of pollution, where a > c + A. Clearly, the abatement tax function
adopted here is a linear version of that used by Barrett (1994). The pollution
level under the dirty technology is e(q) = q, whereas e(q) = 0,∀q under the
clean technology.
Observe that under the dirty technology the one period profit function
of the firm is pi(q) = p(a− q)− (c + A)q. Thus the optimal value of pi(q) is
(a−c−A)2
4
, whereas under the clean technology the optimal one period profit
of the firm is (a−c˜)
2
4
. Thus the dirty technology is chosen for any A such that
(a− c− A)2
4
>
(a− c˜)2
4
− F.
Further, the clean technology is chosen for any A′ > Aˆ, where Aˆ solves
(a−c−Aˆ)2
4
= (a−c˜)
2
4
− F. Thus the Porter’s hypothesis goes through for any
abatement tax pair, (A, A′), whenever A′ > Aˆ and A satisfies
2[(a− c˜)2 − (a− c− A)2] > 4F > [(a− c˜)2 − (a− c− A)2].
It is straightforward to construct parameter values such that these conditions
are satisfied, thus establishing that our analysis is robust to a more realistic
abatement tax function.
Non-deterministic R&D. Note that we assume that the new technol-
ogy is deterministic, in that an investment of F yields the new technol-
ogy with probability one. A more realistic assumption is that R&D is non-
deterministic.5 Suppose that in case the firm spends F on R&D in period
1, then it succeeds with probability λ, where 0 < λ < 1. In case of success
the firm has access to the new technology in both periods, whereas in case of
failure it has access to the existing technology in both periods. For simplic-
ity, we assume that once a firm invests in R&D in period 1 and fails, further
5I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this point.
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investment in R&D at t = 2 will not lead to success, and there will be no
further investment at t = 2. In case it did not invest in period 1 however,
then it can invest F in period 2, when the success probability is again λ. It
is now simple to derive the corresponding expressions for U ti . For this case
note, for example, that U11 = λp˜i
m+(1−λ)(pim−A)−F when the firm invests
in innovation in the first period. Using these expressions and mimicing the
argument in Proposition 1, we have
Proposition 3 Let 2λ(p˜im − pim) − 2A′(1 − λ) > F − 2A > λ(p˜im − pim) −
A(2− λ). Then there exists (A,A′), where A′ > A, such that for A′ the firm
switches to the clean technology and its discounted profit is higher compared
to that under A, so that the Porter hypothesis goes through for (A,A′).
R&D lag. Finally we explicitly allows for the fact that R&D is not in-
stantaneous.6 Suppose that on investing F in R&D, it takes one period for
the R&D to yield the full benefits, though there are some interim benefits.
For simplicity, suppose that the interim technology has the same production
cost function as the existing technology i.e. c(q), though it is clean. Note
that the net interim payoff from investing in the new technology is therefore
pim−F . In the next period (if there is one), the firm obtains the full benefit
from the R&D, i.e. a cost function of c˜(q), as well as a clean technology.
Thus if the firm invests in R&D at t = 1, then its net payoff in t = 1 is
pim−F , and that in t = 2 is p˜im. It is now routine to mimic the argument in
Proposition 1 to show
Proposition 4 Let p˜im − pim > F − 2A > −A. Then there exists A˜ (>
A) such that for all A′ > A˜, the firm switches to the clean technology and
its discounted profit is higher compared to that under A, so that the Porter
hypothesis goes through for (A,A′).
6I am indebted to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to work on this point.
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4 Conclusion
The Porter hypothesis has important implications for policy, suggesting, as
it does, that environmental regulation may lead to a win-win situation (so
that the traditional cost-benefit analysis of environmental regulation may
need to be qualified, at least in some cases). The validity of this argument
has however been challenged by Portney (1994) and Palmer et al. (1995).
Following this critique, the literature has focused on strategic interactions
while trying to provide a foundation for the Porter hypothesis. The present
paper extends the literature by showing that in the presence of hyperbolic
preferences, the Porter hypothesis may go through even in the absence of
any strategic interactions. This is likely to hold whenever R&D costs are at
an intermediate level, and the firms have a large planning horizon.
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